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Abstract
This study investigates the impact of environmental regulation on the cost structure of
Brazilian manufacturing plants. We adopt a dual approach where production technology is
represented by a cost function, approximated by a translog form. The model is estimated on
a sample of 404 industrial establishments located in the state of Sªo Paulo, Brazil. We show
that environmental regulation (both formal and informal) has a limited impact on the cost
of manufacturing ￿rms in Brazil. This small impact is however cost-increasing. Finally, we
￿nd little evidence supporting the view that informal regulation modi￿es ￿rm’s behavior.
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author.Non-technical Summary
Identifying and estimating the impact of the environmental regulation on ￿rm’s costs is still
an unresolved issue, both in the applied and the theoretical literature. The standard neoclassical
analysis concludes that environmental regulation decreases productivity of ￿rms by forcing them
away from their optimal production choices. On the contrary, the non-neoclassical view is that
productivity may increase if ￿rms did not behave optimally prior regulation being imposed.
The idea is that environmental regulation gives managers more incentives for being e￿cient.
Moreover, a cleaner equipment can also be more productive than a old equipment vintage. We
contribute to the vast literature trying to assess the impact of environmental regulation on the
cost of ￿rms, ￿rst by introducing the emitted pollution of ￿rms into a neoclassical cost function
approach and second, by considering both the formal and the informal regulation framework. To
our best knowledge, we propose the ￿rst cost function estimate for the Brazilian industry taking
into account both the formal and the informal environmental regulation framework. Hence, some
previous works have suggested that in countries where enforcement of regulation is weak, ￿rms
may comply to environmental standards because of informal regulation (pressure from community
and/or Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), media coverage of environmental cases,...)
by local communities but only few articles have econometrically tested such an hypothesis.
In order to investigate the impact of environmental regulation on the cost structure of Brazil-
ian manufacturing plants, we adopt a dual approach where production technology is represented
by a multiproduct cost function. Emitted pollution of ￿rms is viewed as a negative joint prod-
uct of the conventional output. The multiproduct cost function is approximated by a translog
form and the model is estimated on a sample of 404 industrial establishments located in the
state of Sªo Paulo, Brazil. The most important empirical ￿ndings are the following ones. First,
by introducing variables describing environmental regulation in the translog speci￿cation of the
2cost function, we show that the regulatory framework has a signi￿cant but moderate impact on
the cost of industrial ￿rms in Brazil. Moreover, ￿rms facing a more stringent environmental
regulation (in particular, ￿rms subjected to regularly inspections by the environmental agency)
tend to have higher production costs. This provides some empirical evidence against the Porter’s
hypothesis. In line with Ferraz et al. (2002), we conclude that informal regulation does not have
a signi￿cant impact on ￿rm’s behavior. Second, we show that pollution abatement costs for
the Brazilian manufacturing sector are very low. This is especially true for the most pollution-
intensive sectors like food and beverage and metals. This suggests that there is a great scope
for welfare gains by reinforcing the environmental control activities in place, since a reduction of
pollution emissions can be achieved without important production cost increases.
31 Introduction
A number of developing countries have recently moved from an historical environment regulation
system based on a ￿command and control approach￿ toward more incentive-based instruments
like pollution taxes (emission charge in China and Central Europe), input or output taxes (leaded
gas tax in Thailand and Philippines), tradeable permits (water rights in Chile). 1 This trend is
not surprising as developing countries have limited ￿nancial resources and very often face severe
pollution problems, making the command and control approach di￿cult and costly to implement
(especially in the case of a large number of small polluting ￿rms). Another reason for moving
toward incentive-based instruments is the requests from multilateral development organizations
such as the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank which are important ￿nancing sources
of developing countries environmental programs, Anderson (2002).
In Brazil, an example of such incentive-based instrument is currently under development
for managing water at the basin level. The main important initiative is the implementation of
water charges in the Para￿ba do Sul River Basin, that has been initiated in March 2003. This
experimental case study has been promoted by the Para￿ba do Sul River Basin Committee with
the assistance of the National Water Agency. The charge is intended to apply to industrial,
domestic and agricultural users.
Implementation of incentive-based instruments, like emission tax, must however overcome
two main di￿culties in order to be e￿cient. First, charges must be based on an observable
measure of emissions or e￿uents, which may be in some cases di￿cult to de￿ne. Charges on air
pollution are for example not straightforward to compute because it is often di￿cult to measure
mass emissions that may vary over time. Second, measures of the marginal cost of pollution on
1See among others, Pargal and Wheeler (1996) for an analysis of the impact of formal and informal regulation
on pollution in Indonesia, Wang and Lall (1999) for an example on China, Ferraz et al. (2002) for an econometric
analysis of Brazilian’s ￿rms environmental investment decisions or Anderson (2002) for a recent survey of incentive-
based instruments for controlling pollution in developing countries.
4environment and the marginal cost of abatement are required in order to assess the optimal level
of the tax. The environmental taxes must balance the cost imposed on ￿rms 2 and the welfare
gain resulting from a better quality of environment. Measuring these gains and costs is clearly
still a challenging issue.
This paper contributes to the vast literature trying to assess the impact of environmental
regulation on the cost of ￿rms by estimating a cost function on a sample of forms located in
Brazil. To our knowledge, this is the ￿rst cost function estimate for Brazilian industry taking
into account the formal and informal environmental regulation framework. Identifying and esti-
mating the impact of environmental regulation on the cost of ￿rms is still an unresolved issue,
both in the applied and the theoretical literature. The standard neoclassical analysis concludes
that environmental regulation decreases productivity of ￿rms by forcing them away from the
optimal production choices. On the contrary, the non-neoclassical view is that productivity may
increase if ￿rms did not behave optimally prior regulation being imposed, the idea being that
environmental regulation gives manager more incentives for being e￿cient and that a cleaner
equipment can also be more productive than a old equipment vintage.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the literature
dealing with the potential impact of environmental regulation (both formal and informal) on
￿rm’s cost structure and we introduce the economic model. Section 3 presents the econometric
modeling and the empirical application to the manufacturing sector in Brazil. Industrial produc-
tion technologies are represented by long-term cost functions and are approximated by a translog
form. We include in this framework an index of pollution emissions measuring water e￿uents
emitted by ￿rms. Then, in Section 4, we derive some policy implications.
2In the US, according to the Pollution Abatement Cost Expenditure Survey, abatement operating costs rep-
resented $ 18 billion dollars in 1993. They have doubled from 0.3% of total cost in 1973 to 0.6% in 1993.
52 Environmental regulation and production costs
2.1 Environmental regulation and productivity
There is a vast literature (both theoretical an empirical) trying to assess the relationship between
environmental regulation and productivity of ￿rms. In a famous article published in 1991, Porter
(1991) has suggested that ￿Strict environmental regulations do not inevitably hinder competitive
advantage against foreign rivals; indeed, they often enhance it.￿ The Porter’s idea is that envi-
ronmental regulation which reduces pollution damages can also lead to a decrease of costs and an
increase in competitiveness of ￿rms.3 But this so-called ￿Porter hypothesis￿ has been recognized
by many economists as clearly controversial. In particular Palmer et al. (1995) have raised
severe arguments against it, ￿rst pointing out that the empirical evidence supporting Porter’s
hypothesis are quite weak. Second, from a theoretical point of view, the Porter’s hypothesis
presupposes that ￿rms which were not maximizing their pro￿t ex-ante behave optimally once
the environmental regulation has been implemented. Last, most of the empirical studies are
based on total factor productivity analyzes were the production is regressed on input shares. 4
The econometric speci￿cations are however often very ad-hoc and the resulting estimates may
be subject to controversy and discussion. In particular, pollution abatement expenditures are
often used to proxy the environmental regulation. This creates a number of di￿culties. First,
measuring speci￿c pollution abatement expenditures is very di￿cult and this variable may su￿er
from a lack of precision. Second, it is likely that ￿rms will ￿rst react to environmental regulation
3It has been for example suggested that German ￿rms possess some competitive advantage in water-pollution
control technology and US ￿rms dominate hazardous waste management because of relatively stricter regulations.
But the Porter’s hypothesis itself is not very clear and di￿erent interpretations have been proposed. In particular, a
￿narrow version￿ which has given rise to a lot of empirical analyzes is that environmental regulation can stimulate
innovation. Most of the empirical papers have tried to test this assumption by regressing some measure of
innovation on pollution abatement capital. For instance, Ja￿e and Palmer (1997) using a panel of data de￿ned at
the industry level estimate the relationship between pollution control expenditures and two measures of innovative
activity (R&D expenditures and number of successful patents). They ￿nd that the data are consistent with the
weaker version of the Porter hypothesis.
4Working on a sample of plants in the pulp and paper industry, Gray and Shadbegian (2003) ￿nd among others
that total pollution abatement costs reduce productivity by an average 4.8 percent across all the plants.
6by adapting their existing production process. Reduction of pollution emission may not result,
at least at the beginning of the process, in speci￿c pollution abatement investments. In our
framework, we use variables that are directly related to environmental regulation. It follows that
our estimates should not su￿er from the bias we have just depicted.
2.2 Informal environmental regulation and productivity
Informal environmental regulation corresponds to all types of actions taken by citizens, groups
of citizens or Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) aiming at modifying the behavior of
polluting ￿rms. Typically, such actions include the pressure from communities and NGOs on
polluting ￿rm’s, the boycott of ￿rm’s products or the media coverage of environmental cases.
Some previous works have shown that in countries where enforcement of regulation is weak,
￿rms may however comply with environmental standards because of informal regulation by local
communities, Pargal and Wheeler (1996). The idea is that informal regulation may emerge as a
substitute to the de￿cient formal environmental regulation system. Pargal and Wheeler (1996)
mention in particular that informal regulation may play an important role in developing countries
and that it may result in substantial decreases of pollution emissions. For instance, in Indonesia,
the Environmental Impact Management Agency has created a program to rate factories based on
their compliance with national wastewater discharge standards. This rating has been disclosed
to the public and some evidence suggest that the system has signi￿cantly modi￿ed discharge
behaviors: in 1997, 49.2% of factories were in compliance with the environmental regulation
whereas the proportion was only 35.3% two years before. Some further empirical works are
however required to more deeply analyze the impact of informal regulation on pollution emissions
and on the cost structure of ￿rms. This is an issue addressed in the following empirical section.
72.3 A simple model
The model we consider can be derived from the general assumption that ￿rms are minimizing
their total cost. We consider a ￿rm using J inputs in order to produce two goods, Y1 a production
good sold by the ￿rm and Y2 representing the emitted pollution viewed as a joint product of the
production good.5 The emitted pollution could also be considered as a non-conventional input,
but as we will show in this sub-section, such a formulation is equivalent to the one adopted above.
The production function denoted by f, Y1 = f(X,Y2), possesses the usual characteristic of
a neoclassical production function. Our implicit view is that by changing the mix of inputs,
￿rms are able to reduce their pollution emissions while maintaining the production of Y1 at
a given level. The vector of inputs X may contain the usual inputs (capital, labor, material
and energy) used for the production of the conventional output but also some inputs speci￿c to
pollution abatement processes. It is likely that some inputs are used directly for environmental
compliance, a scrubber on a smokestack to reduce SO2 emissions is an example of such speci￿c
inputs.
Denoting by W the vector of input prices, the production expenses related to conventional
inputs write
P
j Wj ·Xj. But the ￿rm also has to pay for its pollution discharge. Those expenses
depend on the level of pollution emitted by the ￿rm (Y2), on some technical characteristics of
the plant such as the existence of an environmental unit or the ISO 14000 norm’s status of the
plant6 (Z1) and on some characteristics of the environmental regulation under e￿ect (Z2). The
total expenses for pollution discharge write Φ(Y2,Z1,Z2). A ￿rm will minimize the sum of its
5In a total productivity framework Boyd, Tolley, and Pang (2002) also consider pollution emitted by a ￿rm
as an undesirable output. Working on a sample of ￿rms in the container glass industry, they show that there are
opportunities both to improve productivity and to reduce pollution.
6ISO 14000 refers to a series of voluntary standards in the environmental ￿eld developed by the International
Organization for Standardization located in Geneva, Switzerland.






j Wj · Xj + Φ(Y2,Z1,Z2)
s.t. Y1 = f(X,Y2).
(1)
The optimal use of inputs is such that marginal productivity of each factor is equal to its price
and that the marginal productivity of pollution is equal to the marginal cost of emissions. In
other word, the pollution emitted is such as the marginal bene￿t from another unit of abatement












∀j,k ∈ {1,...,J}, (2)
where Φ0 is the derivative of the pollution cost with respect to the pollution emitted. It follows
that the input derived demands write as X∗
j[Y1,W,Φ0(Y2,Z1,Z2)] and Y ∗
2 [Y1,W,Φ0(Y2,Z1,Z2)].





j[Y1,w,Φ0(.)] + Φ(Y ∗
2 [Y1,W,Φ0(.)],Z1,Z2). (3)
The resulting cost function depends on the output produced, the pollution emitted, the vector
of conventional input prices and two vectors characterizing the plant and the environmental
regulation under e￿ect.
3 Cost function estimate of Brazilian manufacturing plants
3.1 Environmental regulation in Brazil7
Licensing is the main instrument for environmental management in Brazil. The licensing pro-
cedure sets up a wide scope of command-and-control mechanisms to be observed by industrial
plants (abatement technology, emission standards and other control procedures). All industrial
7For a more detailed description of the Brazilian environmental regulation framework, see Ferraz et al. (2002)
and Seroa Da Motta (2003a).
9activities considered as a potential source of pollution or environmental degradation are required
to possess such an environmental license.
Licensing is conducted by state environmental protection agencies (EPA). The process is
divided in two stages. First, ￿rms interested in constructing a production facility are required
to apply for an installation license. Then, in order to start operations, they must possess an
operation license. Operation licenses are issued after checking that the ￿rm is in compliance
with the environmental technical requirements, and they must be periodically renewed (2-5
years, depending on the sector of industrial activity). Firms may face two kinds of penalties for
non-compliance: administrative sanctions imposed by the EPA, which are set on the basis of the
magnitude of the o￿ense, and/or legal sanctions imposed by the judiciary.
The licensing procedure has raised three types of criticisms. First, the procedure is subject
to excessive delays. According to Couto (2003) ￿it is not uncommon to observe 5-year delays
in the licensing of projects without any technical complexity￿. This is a particularly serious
problem since plants operating without licenses are subject to ￿nes. Secondly, there has been a
discussion about the legal validity of the licensing procedure. Although the Brazilian National
Environmental Law attributes the licensing process to the state EPA, a subsequent regulation has
given to municipalities the power of granting licenses for industrial activities whose environmental
impacts are locally restricted. This con￿ict has created additional costs, both in terms of ￿nancial
resources and time, Vaz Guimarªes De Araœjo (2003). The third criticism of the Brazilian
environmental licensing system is the budget and human resource constraints faced by EPAs
resulting in a is quite asystematic monitoring of ￿rms. In spite of the criticisms, the proportion
of ￿rms in a non-compliance situation concerning environmental licensing is relatively low 8, since
the installation of a ￿rm is easily spotted and licensing is mandatory in order to be eligible to
8As observed by Ferraz et al. (2002), plants failing to be fully licensed may operate within a grace period to
realize some investments in order to conform to the licensed parameters. During this period, they are not legally
considered as non-compliant.
10governmental funds and to ￿scal incentives.
Informal environmental also plays a signi￿cant role in Brazil and relies on the fact that, by
Law, any citizen can act against polluters for noncompliance. Anyone can ￿le a complaint against
an alleged violator and community denouncement is very common in Brazil since it can usually
be made by a telephone call. Morover, once the case gets space in the news media, its priority
on EPA strategies increases, Seroa Da Motta (2003b). An example of the impact of informal
regulation deals with Rio de Janeiro where the protest against a polluting tannery has led to its
relocation to the outskirts of the city, Pargal and Wheeler (1996). NGOs are also frequently an
important source of pressure to denouncement, particularly those that are locally organized.
3.2 A translog speci￿cation of costs
We assume that the unknown cost function (3) can be approximated by a ￿exible form. We use
a translog form that gives a second order approximation to any unknown function. The translog
form is ￿exible, parsimonious and satis￿es price homogeneity assumptions, by imposing a set of
linear restrictions on the parameters to be estimated. The translog approximation of (3) is 9:
ln(TCi) = α0 +
PL
l=1 αl lnYli +
PJ















l=1 γjl lnWji lnYli +
PQ
q=1 µqiZqi (4)
where i = 1,...,N represents industrial ￿rms. Indexes j,k with j,k = 1,...,J, correspond
to inputs and l,m with l,m = 1,...,L, to outputs. The vector Z1 corresponds to technical
characteristics of the ￿rm that may have an impact on cost (industrial sector, location of the
plant,...) and Z2 to the type of environmental formal and informal regulation under e￿ect.
9In the empirical part, we also have considered other speci￿cations of the translog including for example cross-
terms between environmental regulation variables, price of inputs and outputs. All these coe￿cients were not
signi￿cant. For simplicity reasons, we only report the estimate of the translog where environmental regulation
variables do not interact with input prices and outputs.










γjl lnYli j ∈ 1,...,J. (5)
Sji represents the cost share of input j for ￿rm i. Equation (4) associated to J − 1 cost shares
constitutes the economic model to be estimated10.
3.3 Data description
The data used for estimating the cost function come from a survey jointly conducted by the
Coordination of Environmental Studies of the Institute of Applied Economics Research (IPEA)
at Rio de Janeiro and the Center for International Development at Harvard University (CID).
The ￿nal database contains information on economic and environmental management practices
for 404 industrial plants located in the state of Sªo Paulo, Brazil (year 1999).
3.3.1 Input prices
The cost function includes ￿ve inputs namely capital, labor, energy, materials and water. The
cost shares for labor, energy, materials are obtained directly from the questionnaires. Water
expenses include water/wastewater costs and environmental control activities. The capital share
is computed by summing up the depreciation and ￿nancial charges and the other capital expenses.
The price of capital corresponds to the sum of the real interest rate and the depreciation rate.
The price of labor is computed by dividing the total labor and social charge expenditures by the
number of employees. For 84% of the sample, the unit cost of labor belongs to [5,000;25,000]
which is a relevant range of values given the Brazilian yearly wage. Since the questionnaire
does not include information on the quantity of energy used by plants, the price of energy
corresponds to a weighted average of the price (per 106 Kcal) of oil, natural gas, electricity and
10As the sum of cost shares is equal to 1, only J − 1 cost shares must be taken into account otherwise the
variance-covariance matrix would be singular.
12coal computed at the sector-level. The weights are the respective shares in total energy use at
sector-level as reported by the Sªo Paulo Energy Survey, BESP (2000). A material price index
has also been constructed at the sector-level using the input-output matrix computed by the
Brazilian Census Bureau. Last, the water price is obtained by dividing the water/wastewater
and the environmental expenditures by the total quantity of water consumed.
3.3.2 Outputs
We consider two di￿erent outputs, a measure of production Y1 and a measure of plant e￿uents,
Y2. The physical measure of the output produced by the plant, Y1, is computed by dividing the
annual production value by the sectoral wholesale price index (IPA-FGV). The second output
is a measure of e￿uent discharge, Y2. The main empirical problem is that we do not observe
directly this variable at plant-level.11 In order to circumvent this data availability constraint, we
have constructed an e￿uent index based on a principal component analysis (PCA) performed on
variables representing technical characteristics of the ￿rm and on the subjective assessment of
managers concerning ￿rm’s environmental performance. The idea of this procedure is that the
non observable pollution emissions are a complex function of environmental regulation and of
some technical characteristics of the ￿rm. Realizing a PCA on these variables allows to extract
this hidden information, the resulting Y2 being interpreted as an index of e￿uent discharge.12
[ Table 1, here ]
11This is a pervasive problem in developing countries where plant-level monitoring of emitted pollution is at
best imperfect, and where monitoring equipment is often obsolete.
12The PCA is performed using 6 variables possibly correlated to pollution emissions: the total quantity of
water consumed by the plant, a variable describing ￿rms’s self-evaluation of environmental compliance status, a
variable describing ￿rms’s environmental preferences, a dummy equal to 1 if the ￿rm possesses an environmental
unit, a variable describing the certi￿cation status of the ￿rms for ISO 14000, and a dummy equal to 1 if the ￿rm
self-reports pollution emissions to the environmental agency. The e￿uent index is build using the ￿rst component
of the PCA. As we do not observe the true water e￿uents of plants, we can not explicitly evaluate our method.
However, some robustness tests have been conducted. An output-pollution matrix, which relates e￿uents (both
for organic charge, MO, and total suspended solids, TSS) to production, has been computed at the sectoral
level. As expected, our e￿uent index is positively and signi￿cantly correlated with the theoretical MO and TSS
emissions. A more complete presentation of the computation of the pollution index may be found in FØres and
Reynaud (2005).
13Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics on the production costs of ￿rms. It should be
noticed that the survey realized by IPEA/CID has targeted large ￿rms. The average production
cost is larger than 17 millions of R$. On average the number of employees is 271 with a maximum
equal to 4,861. With a cost share equal to 0.457, material is higher input in term of cost expenses.
3.3.3 Regulation and technical characteristics of ￿rms
[ Table 2, here ]
Measuring environmental regulation is a crucial and challenging issue. Most of previous stud-
ies have used pollution abatement capital expenditures as a proxy of environmental regulation
which creates a number of di￿culties (problem of measure and non-accuracy of the proxy among
others). We depart from this literature by directly representing environmental regulation’s char-
acteristics into the cost function of the ￿rm.
Formal environmental regulation It is likely that ￿rms facing di￿erent formal regulatory
regimes (especially environmental regulation) will have di￿erent allocations of inputs. Some
variables describing the ￿rm’s regulatory environment are introduced into the cost function.
Four variables describe the formal environmental regulation: Dsanc3, Dinsp3, LICENSE and
CONTROL. Dsanc3 is a dummy equal to one if the ￿rm has been sanctioned every year (from
1997 to 1999) by the environmental agency. Firms sanctioned every years since 1997 may have
found more cost-e￿ective not to comply with environmental standards. This variable should
have a negative sign. Dinsp3 is a dummy variable equal to one if the plant has been inspected
each year (from 1997 to 1999) by the environmental agency. The LICENSE variable describes
the license status of the plant. It is equal to 1 if the plant has no license yet, 2 if the license
process has started, 3 if the license has been approved conditionally and 4 if the license has been
fully approved. Last, CONTROL is a quantitative variable that measures the e￿ciency of the
14di￿erent regional environmental regulation agencies. It is computed as the ratio between the
number of warning and ￿nes divided by the number of control realized by the agency in 1999.
Informal environmental regulation Some previous works have shown that in countries
where enforcement of regulation is weak, ￿rms may however comply with environmental stan-
dards because of informal regulation by local communities, see Pargal and Wheeler (1996) for
instance Two variables have been introduced in order to take into account the possible impact
of informal regulation on ￿rm’s cost-minimization behaviors: Dexp and Dcomp. Dexp is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the ￿rms exports at least some part of its production in 1999. The idea is
that ￿rms operating on international markets may be given more incentives to respect environ-
mental standards. The result could be higher production costs. However, due to high competition
￿rms operating on international markets should be more e￿cient than ￿rms only operating on
the Brazilian market. The e￿ect of this variable on the production costs is a priori ambiguous.
Dcomp is a dummy variable equal to 1 if some complaints from NGOs or local communities have
been registered from 1997 to 1999. For a large majority of plants, no complaint from NGOs has
been registered.
Technical characteristics We have introduced ￿ve technical characteristics of the plant that
may have an e￿ect on the cost structure: DUNIT, ISO9, ISO14, INV ENV and IBGE6. DUNIT
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the plant possesses an environmental unit. Such a plant should
have higher production costs, everything being equal. ISO9 and ISO14 give the certi￿cation
status of the ￿rms respectively for ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 norms. In order to take into account
some sectoral e￿ects, we consider also a variable describing the type of sector: IBGE6. This
variable has been computed from the Brazilian classi￿cation of ￿rms (Codigo Atividades nivel
80). Last, INV ENV is the ratio of environmental investments to the total investment of the
15￿rm. This variable re￿ects the importance of environmental issues in the production process of
the plant.
3.4 Translog estimate of the cost function
The system of equations made of the cost function (4) and J−1 cost shares (5) has been estimated
by Seemingly Unrelated Regression (model SUR). The cost function being twice di￿erentiable,
the Hessian matrix must be symmetric. The resulting symmetry restrictions are imposed on the
coe￿cient to be estimate. Moreover, the cost function must be homogeneous of degree 1 in input









γjl = 0 (6)
We estimate the system made of the cost function, equation (4), and the 4 cost shares, equations
(5). Results of this estimation are given in Table 3.
[ Table 3, here ]
The cost estimate seems to behave correctly with a capacity of prediction quite good. The
adjusted R square associated to the translog is 0.914. Before commenting on the cost function
estimate, we must check that some regularity conditions are satis￿ed. The cost shares estimated
by the SUR method are positive for all observations: the cost function is increasing with respect
to input prices. Moreover, concavity is satis￿ed for most of our observations.
Next, we consider some restrictions on parameters that, if veri￿ed, would lead to biased esti-
mations of the parameters of the cost function. We test, in particular, the hypothesis of unitary
elasticity of substitution (UES), homotheticity of technology and Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation of
costs.13 The ￿rst test leads to the rejection of the hypothesis of homotheticity of production:
13We use Wald tests that compare constrained and unconstrained models. Results are available from the authors
upon request.
16an increase in the levels of output induces changes in the relative shares of inputs. This result
is important as it validates the cost-minimization program given by equation (1). If emissions
of pollution were separable from the conventional production process, all cross-terms between
Y2 and input prices should be null. Second, we reject the homotheticity of production hypothe-
sis: some inputs serve at reducing pollution emissions. Lastly, the use of a translog function is
relevant since the Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation is rejected.
4 Assessing the impact of environmental regulation on costs
4.1 Formal and informal regulation
By analyzing the coe￿cients related to environmental regulation variables, we can draw some
general conclusions. First, it is interesting to notice that variables describing formal and infor-
mal regulation have only a limited impact on the structure of costs. Among the ten variables
associated to the type of regulation under e￿ect, only three coe￿cients are signi￿cantly di￿erent
from zero, with just one variable signi￿cant at 5% level. This could indicate that the cost of en-
vironmental regulation is still very low for ￿rms. Such a result is interesting as it could give some
basis to decision-makers for increasing the level of environmental standards, since the impact on
production cost should be in such a case limited. Second, even if environmental regulation has a
limited impact on costs, this impact seems to be cost-increasing. Finally, we ￿nd little evidence
supporting the view that informal regulation modi￿es ￿rm’s behavior.
Three management-related variables were included in the regression. The indicator for ￿rms
already having an environmental unit control (Dunit) is signi￿cant. The positive sign is quite
intuitive since they tend to have higher costs. On contrary, ISOs certi￿cates do not seem to have
any e￿ect on costs. Concerning formal regulation, the variable related to the license status of
the ￿rm (LICENSE) is not signi￿cant. The ￿nding that the licensing procedure does not a￿ect
17the cost structure of ￿rms seems to be in line with Ferraz et al. (2002), who found that license
status does not explain environmental investment decisions. The dummy for regularly inspected
plants (Dinsp3) and the dummy for sanctioned plants (Dsanc3) have the expected positive sign,
since plants which are regularly subject to the control of environmental agencies should incur in
higher costs for being in compliance with environmental standards. However, only the coe￿cient
for the inspection dummy is signi￿cant. The fact that sanctions do not have an impact on the
costs could be attributed to the lack of enforcement of the penalties and/or the low value of the
￿nes. Alternatively, it could suggest that inspections are e￿ective enough to a￿ect ￿rm behavior,
while sanctions play a minor role as a regulation instrument.
The variables representing informal regulation are the indicators for complaints from com-
munities or NGOs (Dcomp) and for exports (Dexp). The coe￿cients associated to both dummies
are not signi￿cant. Despite the positive coe￿cient sign, this suggests that informal pressure
from the community is not a signi￿cant determinant of environmental management decisions.
This ￿nding is consistent with the ￿rm’s perception, since very few ￿rms reported community
pressure or complaint as a major determinant for environmental investment when answering the
questionnaire.14 Last and surprisingly, the dummy variable DEXP for ￿rms exporting at least
one part of the production is not signi￿cant. This could result from two opposite e￿ects. First,
exporting ￿rms may have higher cost of production because of more stringent environmental or
quality standards. But those exporting are also the more e￿cient ones. Thus exporting the pro-
duction has an ambiguous e￿ect on the cost. The non-signi￿cance of DEXP however contradicts
Porter’s argument suggesting that ￿rms in industries that are more exposed to competition from
abroad are more likely to have an incentive to innovate to reduce costs than ￿rms operating in
less exposed industries.
14See Ferraz et al. (2002).
184.2 Assessing the marginal cost of pollution abatement
In this paragraph, we compute and analyze the cost elasticity with respect to the production
Y1 and the pollution emitted Y2. Considering the cost elasticity for the emitted pollution is
interesting as it allows to get results on the marginal cost of pollution abatement. In a world where
￿rms face no environmental control (neither formal, such as taxes on emissions or environmental
standards to comply with, nor informal), the optimal level of emission should be such that the
marginal cost of production with respect to the emitted pollution, ∂TC/∂Y2, is null. In a world
where ￿rms face some form of environmental regulation, they should equalize their marginal cost
of production taken with respect to the emitted pollution to the marginal environmental cost. A
one unit increase in pollution emissions results in a decrease of the cost of production given by
∂TC/∂Y2 < 0 and a marginal increase of the environmental control cost. At the optimum, these
two quantities should be equalized by the ￿rm. It follows that −∂TC/∂Y2 can be interpreted as
the cost of pollution abatement.
Results on cost elasticities are reported in Table 4, the cost elasticity with respect to outputs




, i ∈ {1,2}. (7)
[ Table 4, here ]
First, the cost elasticity for the production Y1 is equal to 0.934, meaning that a 1% increase
of the production Y1 results in a 0.93% increase of the cost (we reject constant returns to scale
at 1%). The mean cost elasticity for the production Y1 has been computed by type of industrial
sector. It is interesting to notice that the cost elasticity of production is similar from one sector
to another. Second, most of the parameters associated to Y2 in the translog cost function are
not signi￿cant, and the cost elasticity of pollution (-0.12) is not signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero.
19This indicates that a marginal reduction of the pollution would not result in a signi￿cant increase
of the cost. In other words, the level of pollution of ￿rms is such that their marginal bene￿t
of pollution emission (i.e., the decrease in costs due to an additional emission unit) is close to
zero. If cost-minimizing ￿rms set pollution emissions in order to equal the marginal bene￿t of
these emissions to their marginal cost (resulting both from formal and informal regulation), this
means that they are facing zero marginal emission costs. These results are supported by the non-
signi￿cance of the variables associated to formal and informal regulation, whose values express
the low environmental regulation costs faced by ￿rms. The current level of pollution emissions
is high because emissions costs are negligible, due to ine￿ective formal and informal regulation
mechanisms. So, ￿rms are free to set emissions up to the point where the marginal bene￿t is
zero. Since abatement costs are negligible, signi￿cant reductions of pollution emissions could be
achieved without substantial cost increases. Our results suggest that there is a great scope for
welfare gains by reinforcing the environmental control activities in place and introducing new
policy instruments, such as water charges, which are planned to be implemented in the near
future.
These results have been complemented by an analyze by industrial sector. It is interesting
to notice that the cost elasticity with respect to the pollution emitted varies according to the
industrial sector considered (the variability is much higher for the pollution than for the standard
output produced by ￿rms). Three sectors present cost elasticity with respect to the pollution
signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero: Electricity, Textile and Other. One explanation could be that
as these sector are viewed are important pollution producers15, implementation of environmental
policy may be more stringent.
15The Electricity and the Textile sectors present the highest water e￿uent indexes.
205 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the impact of environmental regulation on the cost structure
of Brazilian manufacturing plants. Adopting a dual representation of industrial production
technologies, we have estimated a Translog cost function and the derived demands for inputs
(capital, labor, energy, material and water) using establishment-level data for ￿rms located the
state of Sªo Paulo, Brazil. We think that assessing the impact of environmental regulation
on costs (or on the productivity) of ￿rms requires very detailed data (micro data) as pollution
reduction investments or a change in inputs use can result from the pressure of local population or
from the e￿ciency of a local environmental agency. It is likely that the impact of such important
determinants may not appear at a more aggregate level. This could explain the large range of
results of the empirical literature on environmental regulation and costs.
The most important empirical ￿ndings are the following ones. First, by introducing variables
describing environmental regulation in the translog speci￿cation of the cost function, we have
shown that the regulatory framework has a signi￿cant but moderate impact on the cost of in-
dustrial ￿rms in Brazil. Moreover, ￿rms facing a more stringent environmental regulation (in
particular, ￿rms subjected to regularly inspections by the environmental agency) tend to have
higher production costs. This provides some empirical evidence against the Porter’s hypothesis.
In line with Ferraz et al. (2002), we conclude that informal regulation does not have a signi￿cant
impact on ￿rm’s behavior. Second, we have shown that pollution abatement costs for the Brazil-
ian manufacturing sector are very low. This is especially true for the most pollution-intensive
sectors like food and beverage and metals. This suggests that there is a great scope for welfare
gains by reinforcing the environmental control activities in place, since a reduction of pollution
emissions can be achieved without important production cost increases.
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23Table 1: Descriptive statistics, costs
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Total Cost R$ 17,226,823 32408331 100,000 289,800,000
Y1 index 117.119 230.587 2.092 2146.769
Y2 index 4.822 1.402 1.000 7.738
Sk − 0.200 0.125 0.005 0.875
Sl − 0.297 0.150 0.037 0.917
Se − 0.039 0.037 0.000 0.255
Sm − 0.457 0.170 0.010 0.954
Sw − 0.006 0.012 0.000 0.150
Wk R$ by 1,000 R$ 9.983 7.877 148 213
Wl R$ by employee 14394 7984 3111 47806
We R$ by 1,000,000 Kcal 6.946 0.902 4.071 8.107
Wm R$ by unit of material index 8.624 5.723 24.402 63.786
Ww R$ by m3 3.675 1.954 0.004 9.709
Xk 25573 66189 12 954894
Xl Number of employees 271 475 6 4861
Xe 1,000,000 Kcal 94882 210450 10 2261891
Xm Index 307758 641218 167 5917206
Xw m3 51438 176737 6 1560000
24Table 2: Descriptive statistics, regulation and technical characteristics
Variable Frequency Percent
Formal regulation
DSanc3 Yes 15 3.71
No 389 96.29
Dinsp3 Yes 212 52.48
No 192 47.52
LICENSE No license 21 0.5
Beginning process 10 2.48
Conditionally approved 72 17.82
Fully approved 320 79.21
CONTROL ￿ 0.178 0.055
Informal regulation
Dexp Yes 200 49.50
No 204 50.50
Dcomp Yes 62 15.35
No 342 84.65
Technical characteristics
Dunit Yes 73 18.07
No 331 81.93
ISO9 No 74 18.32
3 years 84 20.79
Beginning process 43 10.64
Advanced process 38 9.41
Yes 165 40.94
ISO14 No 205 50.72
3 years 127 31.44
Beginning process 47 11.63
Advanced process 14 3.47
Yes 11 2.72






INV ENV ￿ 10.92 22.90
Note: CONTROL and INV ENV are quantitative variables. Columns 3
and 4 respectively give the mean and the standard-error.
25Table 3: Parameter Estimates of the Translog cost function
Variable Estimate Std. Error Student-T Variable Estimate Std. Error Student-T
CONST 15.747 0.181 87.15 WeY1 -0.002 0.002 -0.78
Y1 0.934 0.017 54.69 WMY1 0.050 0.007 6.85
Y2 -0.119 0.080 -1.49 WwY1 -0.001 0.001 -1.22
Wk 0.202 0.006 32.93 Y2Y2 -0.115 0.207 -0.56
Wl 0.290 0.008 36.25 WkY2 -0.018 0.019 -0.95
We 0.040 0.002 17.22 WlY2 -0.032 0.025 -1.31
WM 0.461 0.008 58.48 WeY2 -0.004 0.007 -0.53
Ww 0.007 0.001 5.32 WMY2 0.059 0.025 2.40
WkWk 0.088 0.046 1.94 WwY2 -0.004 0.004 -1.09
WkWl -0.037 0.012 -3.22 Y1Y2 -0.054 0.043 -1.28
WkWe 0.020 0.018 1.12 Dsanc3 0.015 0.040 0.38
WkWM -0.073 0.037 -1.94 Dinsp3 0.070 0.038 1.85
WkWw 0.002 0.004 0.36 LICENSE -0.016 0.033 -0.50
WlWl 0.072 0.015 4.88 CONTROL -0.569 0.314 -1.81
WlWe -0.006 0.004 -1.27 Dexp 0.051 0.037 1.37
WlWM -0.028 0.014 -1.98 Dcomp 0.064 0.049 1.33
WlWw -0.001 0.002 -0.40 Dunit 0.106 0.052 2.03
WeWe -0.019 0.012 -1.67 ISO9 0.000 0.000 0.39
WeWM 0.002 0.012 0.18 ISO14 0.000 0.000 0.13
WeWw 0.003 0.002 1.58 Dele -0.254 0.063 -4.03
WMWM 0.102 0.040 2.56 Dche -0.463 0.071 -6.51
WMWw -0.003 0.004 -0.77 Dtex -0.069 0.059 -1.17
WwWw 0.000 0.001 -0.06 Dfoo 0.434 0.092 4.71
Y1Y1 0.012 0.017 0.71 Doth -0.162 0.052 -3.12
WkY1 0.016 0.006 2.79 INV ENV 0.001 0.001 1.43
¯ R2
Cost Equation 0.914
￿Capital￿ cost share 0.137
￿Energy￿ cost share 0.088
￿Material￿ cost share 0.194
￿Water￿ cost share 0.091
26Table 4: Elasticity of cost with respect to outputs
Cost elasticity of Y1 Cost elasticity of Y2
Sector Mean Stdev. Min. Max. Mean Stdev. Min. Max.
Metal 0.93 0.03 0.88 0.99 -0.10 0.06 -0.24 0.02
Electricity 0.93 0.03 0.89 1.02 -0.14 0.07 -0.27 0.13
Chemical 0.95 0.03 0.90 1.03 -0.12 0.07 -0.30 0.07
Textile 0.93 0.02 0.88 1.01 -0.12 0.06 -0.30 0.05
Food 0.96 0.02 0.92 1.02 -0.04 0.07 -0.19 0.10
Other 0.93 0.03 0.88 1.05 -0.13 0.06 -0.30 0.06
Total 0.93 0.03 0.88 1.05 -0.12 0.07 -0.30 0.13
27